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On 10 September, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
annulled a decision issued by the European Commission on 28 October 2016 
allowing the Russian Gazprom to send greater volumes of gas through the 
OPAL pipeline. The CJEU judgment was issued following a complaint 
submitted on 16 December 2016 by Poland, supported by Lithuania and 
Latvia, against the Commission’s decision, which on the other hand was 
formally supported by Germany. The CJEU found in favour of Poland and 
overturned the Commission’s decision, saying that it had been issued in 
breach of the principle of energy solidarity provided for in art. 194 of the 
TFEU. The judgment means that the OPAL capacity available to Gazprom 
has now been reduced, effective immediately, by 12.8 bcm per year, as has 
transmission via Nord Stream and Germany, as a result. 
The judgment will probably remain in force, and this is a good outcome for 
Poland and all parties/sides interested in Gazprom’s domineering position on 
the European gas market being reduced, and opposed to new Russian export 
pipelines such as Nord Stream 2 being built. The decision will hurt Germany 
above all, which benefits from the increasing volume of gas being sent 
through the country, but will also hurt the Czech Republic and other actors 
that buy gas via Nord Stream. At the same time, the decision exacerbates the 
already existing divisions between member states. The CJEU’s judgment is 
evidently a blow to Gazprom and Russia, limiting Russia’s export capacity at 
an already difficult time (talks to negotiate a gas deal with Ukraine, and winter 
approaching). If it remains in force, it will mean that in the next few years, 
Gazprom cannot afford to stop transit through Ukraine, which is one of the 
main objectives of Russia’s energy policy. The ruling might also have negative 
consequences for Nord Stream 2, as there is less chance of the project being 
granted EU law exemptions. This also raises the question of if and how the 
principle of energy solidarity, reinforced by the CJEU ruling, can be applied to 
the project. For the duration, the ruling will strengthen Ukraine’s position, and 
that of the EU as well, in talks with Russia about transit through Ukraine in the 
future and the forthcoming trilateral negotiations. At the same time, it could 
trigger some sort of retaliation on the part of Russia.  
  
State of play before the CJEU decision and context 
The OPAL pipeline, which goes from Greifswald in the North-East of 
Germany, to Brandov on the German-Czech border, is the largest onshore leg 
of Nord Stream. Its capacity at the entry point is approximately 36.5 bcm per 
year, and approximately 32 bcm at the exit point. It is 80% owned by WIGA 
(jointly owned by Gazprom and Wintershall), and is subsidiary E.On. owns the 
remaining 20%. The terms for using OPAL, including how the third energy 
package and third-party access (TPA) rule apply to the pipeline, have been 
under discussion and a cause of controversy for more than a decade. Even 
before the pipeline was completed and commissioned in 2011, Gazprom, 
supported by the German regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA), tried to 
obtain exemption from EU rules for 100% of OPAL capacity a guarantee of 
long-term use of the entire pipeline. In 2009, the EC agreed to exempt from 
the TPA rule for transit  capacity of the OPAL pipeline (capacity from Germany 
to the Czech Republic): over 50% of the  capacity (even as much as 100%) 
provided that the 3 bcm per year gas release programme  was 
implemented(sale to third parties by auction at any point of the 
pipeline)or  50% of capacity without the programme. Due to the fact that 
Gazprom never introduced that programme, up until the end of 2016 50% of 
OPAL  capacity was exempted from the TPA obligation and the pipeline was 
used (mainly by Gazprom) below its true potential. Approximately 12.8 bcm of 
capacity remained unused each year. 
Gazprom tried to get this changed with support from Germany (BNetzA), 
arguing that as there were no third parties interested in the unused 50% of 
OPAL capacity, it should be allowed to use it. After a few years of avoiding the 
decision and prolonging the administrative procedure, the EC approved the 
German regulator’s decision changing the rules for OPAL capacity booking 
and allowing increased use by Gazprom[1]. Even though the EC’s decision 
was promptly contested by Poland (and PGNiG SA, PGNiG Supply & Trading 
GmbH) and complaints were filed for a stay of execution of the EC’s decision, 
, EU and German courts gave permission for use of OPAL capacity to be 
increased temporarily under the new rules, while awaiting the CJEU’s final 
judgment in the case. 
This led to a distinct increase in the volumes of Russian gas transmitted via 
Nord Stream and OPAL. In December 2016, the first auctions were held for 
the additional capacity available due to the EC decision. Since 2017, the route 
has mostly been used at almost 100% (at times above the maximum technical 
capacity), which affected among other things levels of gas transit through 
Ukraine and Slovakia. As EU imports of Russian gas were on the increase, 
these also rose, but the increases would have been higher if OPAL (and Nord 
Stream) had been exploited to a lesser extent. Nord Stream continues to be 
Gazprom’s preferred export route, and is used to the maximum extent 
possible. While, prior to the EC’s 2016 decision, it transmitted  43.8 bcm of 
gas in that year, by 2018 transmission had reached 58.7 bcm, exceeding the 
pipeline’s nominal capacity of 55 bcm annually. 
  
What does the CJEU judgment mean? 
When annulling the EC’s October 2016 decision, the CJEU found that the EC 
had breached treaty (TFEU) provisions by not referring in its decision to the 
principle of energy solidarity, and not examining that principle. Among other 
things, the EC was found not to have considered the impact the new OPAL 
regime and greater use of OPAL capacity would have on the security of 
supply in third countries including Poland, the consequences of transferring to 
the Nord Stream – OPAL route the portion of gas previously transmitted via 
the Yamal and Brotherhood pipelines, and not having weighed these 
consequences against the benefits that increased use of OPAL would have 
for security of supply at EU level. The CJEU judgment also stated that the 
principle of energy solidarity was not applicable solely in crisis situations 
(described in the 2017 regulation on security of gas supplies), as the EC had 
claimed, but also applied in the normal circumstances in which the EU gas 
market functions and also includes the EU’s and member states’ obligation to 
account for the interests of other parties active on that market. 
The CJEU judgment takes effect immediately, retrospectively (from the time 
the EC adopted the decision), and to all parties. As a result, the OPAL 
pipeline capacity available to Gazprom will fall to 50% of Gazprom’s 
attributable capacities (6.4 bcm is attributable to E.On), which is 
approximately 12.8 bcm per year. At the same time, according to previous EC 
and German BNetzA decision, the Russian company will retain the option of 
access to 100% of capacity, if it implements a release programme for 3 bcm 
of gas. The EC has two months and ten days to appeal against the CJEU’s 
judgment, but the EC would probably not be able to seek a stay of execution 
of the judgment for the duration of review of the appeal (to reinstate the 
October 2016 decision). This is because this is ruled out under art. 60 of the 
CJEU statute. 
In the context of the CJEU’s ruling, the status of the additional OPAL 
capacities that Gazprom booked in advance (for consecutive days/months) 
remains unclear. The CJEU judgment does however seem to open the way 
for parties that suffered losses due to the EC’s decision being implemented 
and greater temporary use  of OPAL (and Nord Stream) by Gazprom, to seek 
compensation.  
At the moment it is difficult to foresee when and how, if at all, the new EC will 
decide to appeal against  the CJEU judgment. If the EC were to do this, this 
would call into question the primary law principle of energy solidarity , one of 
the fundamental issues for how the EU functions. Contesting the CJEU 
judgment, it would also hinder its own activities in short-term issues crucial for 
the EU gas market and security of supply in the next few weeks and months. 
In fact, the EC’s response is  not helped by the process of a new EC being 
formed under Ursula von der Leyen, and that the new commissioners have to 
orientate themselves in complex issues regarding the rules for using OPAL 
and Nord Stream and the market and political implications of the measures 
taken. 
  
What the CJEU judgment means for the EU 
The judgment is a major victory for Poland, and Lithuania and Latvia, which 
supported Poland, and all actors seeking full application of EU law with 
respect to Gazprom’s export infrastructure in the EU (to Nord Stream 2 as well 
as OPAL). It is also a definite success for Ukraine and all those in favour of 
sustained transit through Ukraine. At the same time, it is a defeat not only for 
the EC, but also, perhaps even to a greater extent, for Germany. In its 
decision of October 2016, the Commission gave the green light for a new form 
of regulation of the access to OPAL, which was proposed by the German 
regulator, and Germany formally supported the EC in the dispute with Poland. 
Germany also derives considerable profits from the increasing transmission of 
Russian gas through its territory, and clearly wishes to increase it further (by 
building Nord Stream 2 and EUGAL). 
The CJEU’s decision is also costly however for others, such as the Czech 
Republic. Gas from OPAL is transmitted southwards through the Czech gas 
network. Moreover, the reduced OPAL capacity available to Gazprom is 
sometimes interpreted as another challenge to safeguarding of stable gas 
supplies for the coming winter. Thus the judgment highlights, and could 
potentially exacerbate as well, the differences in interests and positions of 
Poland (and some CEE and Scandinavian countries) and Germany (and 
some other EU countries). 
At the same time, the CJEU judgment on OPAL significantly reinforced 
applicability of the principle of energy solidarity in activities and decisions of 
EU institutions and member states. The need pointed out in the ruling for 
weighing profits and losses arising from specific projects/measures and/or 
decisions for security of supply or functioning of the gas market, not only of 
the EU as a whole but also individual countries, is an important element 
complementing hitherto EU practice. It is also in line with the increasing 
emphasis the EC is placing on the regional aspects of EU energy policy and 
the requirement for member states to work together, provided for among other 
things in the security of gas supply regulation, but also in the new, tool,, 
crucial for the EC, for the Energy Union governance, the national energy and 
climate plans (NECPs). 
The stress placed on the principle of solidarity in the CJEU ruling could 
potentially increase the EC’s role in the case of projects seen as controversial 
by EU countries, such as Nord Stream 2 or the European section of 
TurkStream. It is possible that in light of the wording of the CJEU judgment, 
other member states will also raise claims based on the principle of energy 
solidarity (Slovakia, which has seen a distinct decrease in gas transit since 
Nord Stream and OPAL started operating, and Bulgaria, where transit through 
the trans-Balkan pipeline is expected to fall once the first line of TurkStream 
comes onstream, which is scheduled for December 2019). 
Gazprom’s reduced access to the OPAL pipeline, and therefore lower level of 
use of the company’s preferred route for gas exports to the EU (Nord Stream) 
in the context of the continued controversies surrounding future use of Nord 
Stream 2 (question of the gas directive) and surrounding gas transit through 
Ukraine, could further complicate gas relations between the EU and Russia. 
This will also definitely have an impact on the agenda and directions of the 
newly formed EC’s gas policy. Even though climate issues, including the role 
gas plays in the EU energy transition, have now indisputably become and will 
be top priority for the new EC, secure stable gas supply to the EU and 
devising a cohesive framework for cooperation with Russia and Ukraine in the 
gas sector will continue to be an important topic, at least in the near future. 
  
Implications for gas transit through Ukraine 
The OPAL CJEU judgment comes at a crucial moment for the EU and the gas 
market. Due to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and 
Gazprom’s continued construction of new export routes (Nord Stream 2 and 
TurkStream) the issue of the future of gas transit from Russia through Ukraine 
remains unresolved. At the end of 2019, the 11-year-old transit contract 
between Russia and Ukraine will expire. Apart from questions about future 
routes and the strategy for Russian gas exports to Europe, this is causing 
concern about stability and security of gas supplies for the coming winter. On 
19 September, the long-awaited trilateral gas talks between the EU, Ukraine, 
and Russia on the future of transit (and other issues) are due to be held. The 
restriction placed by the CJEU OPAL ruling on capacities available to 
Gazprom in the route via the Baltic sea and Germany, which is an alternative 
to Ukraine pipelines, will make transit through Ukraine more important, 
especially at the time of highest gas demand in the winter. It will thus 
strengthen Kyiv’s position in the forthcoming negotiations, but will also provide 
the EC with additional arguments,  which for a long time has been aiming to 
guarantee secure transit and formulate a long-term agreement underpinning 
it. Even if an appeal process is were launched, the continued uncertainty 
surrounding the rules of access to OPAL and Nord Stream would work to 
Ukraine’s advantage. 
Although the judgment does not guarantee by itself that a new Russian-
Ukraine transit agreement will be reached and that Russia will not temporarily 
stop gas transmission through Ukraine from 1 January 2020,  this is 
sustaining Russia’s already relatively high dependency on Ukrainian pipelines, 
even once the new export routes (Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream) are in 
operation. In the best case scenario for Gazprom, (rapid construction of Nord 
Stream 2, both lines of TurkStream and full access to their capacities) it will 
have to transmit through Ukraine in the next few years (depending on total 
exports to Europe) between  30 and 50 bcm of gas. In the worst case scenario 
(the restrictions on Nord Stream access due to the ruling on OPAL, limited 
options for use of Nord Stream 2 and a delay in opening the second line of 
TurkStream) – it could be forced to transmit through Ukraine between 70 and 
almost 100 bcm/y. 
According to Ukrainian experts, a minimum of 30–40 bn m3 of gas has to be 
transmitted per year in order to sustain the Ukrainian transit pipeline system. 
Transit of Russian gas remains a crucial source of revenue for Ukraine 
(approximately USD 3 bn per year). 
  
Implications for Gazprom and Nord Stream 2 
The CJEU judgment will have a range of adverse consequences for Gazprom, 
not only related to having to maintain transit through Ukraine. Firstly, the 
Russian company will have to substantially reduce the volume of gas 
transmitted via Nord Stream, and this will decrease its profit(according to 
media reports the EC decision of October 2016 resulted in increased incomes 
for Gazprom of approximately EUR 300 mn per year). 
Secondly, the judgment may also result in adverse consequences for the Nord 
Stream 2 project. This project seems to be in breach of the principle of energy 
solidarity, which was given significant legal status in the CJEU judgment. 
Although the project is formally being implemented by a Swiss –registered 
company ( wholly owned by Gazprom), in practice it is a joint undertaking 
between the Russian company and Western European companies, also 
receiving political support from some EU member states, principally Germany. 
In addition, construction of Nord Stream 2 within the EU required Nord Stream 
2 AG to obtain permits and clearances from public authorities in the member 
states through which it runs. Due to the fact that work on the project is 
underway despite opposition from some EU countries, the CJEU judgment 
could potentially be used to directly contest the lawfulness of Nord Stream 2 in 
the context of the principle of energy solidarity provided for in the TFEU 
(under EU law member states can file complaints against other member 
states for breach of EU law). The CJEU ruling and stress on the need to 
respect the principle of energy solidarity could also inspire  Denmark to 
prolong the ongoing process of granting the permit for construction of the 
pipeline in its waters, or - considering the controversy surrounding NS2 - the 
Danish side could submit a question for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU 
asking whether issuing a permit for the project would be a breach of the 
principle of energy solidarity in the EU underlined by the CJEU. 
Even if construction of Nord Stream 2 is not found to be unlawful, the CJEU 
ruling reduces the chances that the infrastructure under construction will be 
granted EU law exemptions, in particular the Third-Party Access (TPA) rule. 
According to an amendment to the gas directive, TPA should apply to the 
section of the pipeline running through German territorial waters. This would 
mean that Gazprom could use 50% of the transmission capacity of Nord 
Stream 2, which would be approximately 27.5 bcm per year. The result would 
be not only less flexibility with respect to the Russian firm’s export options; it 
would also mean less revenues from transit fees, in turn rendering the entire 
project less profitable. 
Responses and possible action on the part of Russia 
To date, Russia’s reactions to the ruling have not been substantial. Gazprom 
Export (a subsidiary of Gazprom) representatives have said that they are 
looking at the legal and commercial implications of the judgment. The CJEU’s 
judgment was criticised however by Russian experts and commentators, 
some suggesting that the ruling was politically motivated. The ruling will most 
likely lead the Russian authorities and Gazprom management to adopt a more 
severe tone regarding future gas cooperation between Russia, Ukraine, and 
the EU. Another possibility is demonstrative measures towards the EU or 
Ukraine. The CJEU judgment will also probably lead Russia to take a more 
rigorous stand in the next rounds of trilateral talks on gas and increase the 
likelihood that any agreement forged will be signed at the turn of 2019 and 
2020 at the earliest. Although Russia will definitely adopt stalling tactics during 
the talks and try to use a real possibility of a gas crisis after 1 January 2020 as 
leverage, ultimately it will have no choice but to enter into a new transit 
agreement. 
At the same time, the Russian company will certainly take specific measures 
to adapt. The simplest means of counteracting the harmful effects of the 
CJEU ruling and increasing the potential for use of the OPAL and Nord 
Stream pipelines would be for Gazprom to introduce a gas release 
programme, which is a condition for Gazprom to regain 100% access to the 
OPAL capacities. What is not clear is on what conditions and within what kind 
of timeframe Gazprom would be willing to implement such measures, 
especially as it has not chosen to take them before. This is because it would 
probably entail disclosure of trade secrets such as the price of gas transmitted 
through the OPAL pipeline. This might mean therefore that in order to 
circumvent the restrictions imposed in the ruling, the company would try to 
use the option of sale of gas by auction (a special electronic platform was 
launched by Gazprom Export on 17 August 2018), enabling flexible 
agreement of gas take-off points. Gas sales at the beginning of the off-shore 
section of the pipeline would resolve some legal issues relating to applicability 
of the third energy package, primarily TPA restrictions, which might solve 
problems both with operation of both Nord Stream and of Nord Stream 2, now 
under construction. This would require however a fundamental change to 
Gazprom’s current practices and giving third parties access to transmission of 
gas using off-shore pipelines, and would also entail not only making a new 
method of purchasing gas attractive for users of Russian gas in Europe, but 
also making sure they were willing to cover the cost of transmitting gas to the 
European market from the Russian point of entry to Nord Stream. 
To date there have not been many official comments on the CJEU ruling 
concerning OPAL. Most of the positive responses came from the Polish 
authorities and PGNiG, who were pleased with the ruling. The matter met with 
surprisingly little reaction in Ukraine. One of the few reactions came from the 
vice-president of Naftogaz,  Yuri Vitrenko, who described the judgment as a 
pleasant surprise. The EC has not adopted a formal position. According to a 
vague comment for Reuters, it is currently analysing the CJEU judgment. 
Answering media questions, an EC press officer stated that due to the 2016 
decision being annulled, at the moment Gazprom has a reservation for 50% of 
the OPAL capacity and gave an assurance that the court decision would be 
implemented and executed. 
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